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The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law
Eric A. Posner1
July 26, 2012

Abstract. Immigration law scholars should give more attention to the institutional
structure of immigration law and, in particular, the way that the government
addresses problems of asymmetric information in the course of screening potential
migrants and attempting to control their behavior once they arrive. Economic
models of optimal contracting provide a useful starting point for analyzing this
problem. This approach is applied to several current debates in immigration
scholarship, including controversies over “crimmigration” and courts’ refusal to
extend labor and employment rights to undocumented aliens.

In a series of papers, Adam Cox and I argue that immigration scholars should give more
attention to the institutional structure of immigration law, using models and principles drawn
from economic theory.2 Most existing scholarship takes different approaches. A large doctrinal
literature attempts to work out the legal implications of the immigration code and the cases.3
Another literature, heavily normative, is oriented to advocacy, and is particularly concerned with
racism and other forms of discrimination in immigration law, and the ways in which immigration
law falls short of what authors see as constitutional requirements, international obligations, or
moral principles.4 A third literature takes a historical perspective on immigration law, but usually
focuses like the second literature on the role of racist and other invidious motives in the
evolution of immigration law.5
As a result of these dominant strands in this literature, the institutional structure of
international law and its normative foundations have received less attention than it deserves. By
the institutional structure of immigration law, I mean the rules and institutions of immigration
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law, their behavioral effects, and the connection between these effects and various normative
goals that can plausibly be attributed to immigration policy. So there is a descriptive question—
what effects does immigration law have on the behavior of migrants and Americans who interact
with them, such as employers? And then there is a normative question—do these behavioral
effects advance legitimate goals of public policy?
Of course, the goals of immigration law are heavily contested. Some people believe in
open borders; for these people, immigration law can serve no legitimate purpose. But there
appears to be a rough consensus in this country that open borders are not obligatory, and that
immigration law should permit the migration of people who will make significant contributions
to U.S. social welfare, in particular (1) those who bring important skills or fill gaps in the labor
market, (2) those whose presence would permit family reunification—while in both cases (3)
people who intend to migrate permanently should share American values and be capable of being
assimilated into society. Let us consider these goals as roughly legitimate, and take them as
given. Numerous questions of institutional design remain. How should immigration law be
structured so as to advance these goals? For example, should the government ensure that these
goals are satisfied for each potential migrant by requiring her to take a test? Or would it be better
to let promising migrants enter the country and then make permanent residency conditional on
satisfactory behavior over a period of time?
In this essay, I summarize and develop the approach that Cox and I take to answering
these questions, and use this approach to shed light on recent debates on the institutional design
of immigration law.
I. The Normative Goals of Immigration Law
As noted above, the normative basis of immigration law is heavily contested, but a rough
consensus can be outlined. Below I describe that consensus, relying on the law itself and what
seems like the basic public and political attitude about the law—what people support and what
they oppose. The aim here is not to defend a particular normative agenda, but to provide a fixed
normative baseline, which can be used for understanding the purposes of different provisions of
the immigration code.
The maximand. The ultimate goal of immigration policy is clearly to maximize some
conception of welfare. The major goals of immigration policy, as I discuss below, are related to
improving the well-being or wealth of various individuals or firms. Employers seek skilled
workers; households seek nannies and gardeners; and Americans seek to be reunited with foreign
relatives.
But whose welfare? Should immigration law advance the welfare of Americans only, or
also that of foreigners? The latter view, which has some support among philosophers, is known
2

as cosmopolitanism.6 In the policy and legal literature, this view is manifested in occasional
worries that immigration to the United States will harm people left behind in the migrants’
countries, where brain drain occurs.7 This view ignores the many benefits for foreigners,
including remittances and the circulation of knowledge that takes place when migrants return to
their home countries, as they often do. But whatever its philosophical merits, the cosmopolitan
view has virtually no support in American public policy. Politicians advance the interests of
voters, and foreigners do not vote. The normative basis of immigration law thus is maximization
of the well-being of Americans.8
Economic well-being. The next question is how can immigration law be used to
maximize the well-being of Americans. A frequent answer to this question is that immigration
law should be used to admit highly skilled workers who cannot be found in the United States, or
to fill in “gaps” in the labor market.
A more careful understanding of this goal starts with the observation that the admission
of a migrant has numerous effects, both positive and negative. First, the migrant, whether highly
skilled or not, will expand the labor supply within a particular economic sector. As a result,
wages will drop. Employers (including shareholders) will benefit from lower labor costs; so will
consumers if, as normally occurs, some of the cost savings result in lower prices. Holding all else
equal, American workers in the same sector will experience lower wages (or, if the sector is
booming, their wages will not rise as quickly as they otherwise would). Second, the migrant,
once in the United States, will consume goods and services, increasing demand, and thus
potentially helping American workers who produce goods and services that migrants consume.
Third, the migrant will pay taxes and in this way help finance public goods in the United States.
But fourth, migrants will contribute to congestion—for example, crowding hospitals and schools.
Thus, the empirical effect of migration (both the number of migrants and the types of skills of the
migrants) is a complex question, which cannot be answered in the abstract.
Family reunification. A longstanding goal of U.S. immigration law has been family
reunification. This goal advances social welfare in two ways. First, Americans with close family
relations who are abroad are made better off if those relations are admitted into the United States
as immigrants. In this way, immigration policy addresses the interests of a subset of the
population, those with relations abroad. Second, one might conjecture that by preferring
foreigners with close relations in the United States, the government ensures that many migrants
will receive assistance when they enter this country, and will be in a better position to adjust to a
6
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foreign culture than other immigrants are. The American family relations will likely help the
migrant adjust to a new culture by providing advice in the migrant’s native language, shelter,
financial assistance, and other benefits. It is possible that the emphasis on family reunification in
U.S. immigration law accounts for the high level of assimilation of immigrants, which contrasts
favorably to the experiences in other countries.
National glory, culture, diversity, and investment. Although most of U.S. immigration
law is oriented toward importing workers and family members, a number of more marginal
provisions advance other goals as well. The laws give preference to talented athletes, artists, and
scholars.9 These people help the United States compete against other countries in the areas of
culture and science, and even national glory, as illustrated by the preferences for Olympic
athletes. Immigration law also attempts to ensure that migrants hail from a diverse group of
countries rather than just a few10—possibly reflecting a theory that diversity is valuable, or a fear
that an excessive number of migrants from a single country or culture may cause political
fragmentation.11
Rights. Much immigration law scholarship focuses on the rights of migrants, contending
that immigration law does not give sufficient respect to their rights. A common complaint is that
deportation hearings use summary procedures, or that immigration violations are criminalized.
The literature treats these rights as exogenous, and thus the normative desirability of various
immigration law provisions stands or falls depending on whether they are consistent with those
rights. From the standpoint of social welfare, however, rights must be endogenous: it must be
shown how they advance social welfare. And from the standpoint of national social welfare, one
must explain why giving rights to aliens advances the interests of Americans. I return to this
point in Part II.C., below.
II. The Institutional Approach
A. A Useful Analogy and Some Assumptions
Under the approach argued for in this paper, we assume that the state seeks to achieve the
goals described above by attracting migrants. Formally, the state seeks to maximize (national)
social welfare, but to attract migrants, the state must “pay” the migrants more than their costs
from migration. The costs of migration can be high. They include the financial costs of moving
to a new location, but also—of considerable importance—the psychic costs of leaving family,
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friends, and relations, and moving to a foreign and unfamiliar country, where the language may
be different, and cultural, religious, and social norms are likely to be different.
To make migration attractive for migrants, states do not literally pay them, but states
must allow migrants to keep enough of their earnings, and allow them to remain long enough, to
cover the fixed costs of migration plus the cost of living. As we will see, states must thus offer
migrants various rights or guarantees, so that migrants do not believe that, for example, they will
be deported as soon as an economic downturn occurs in the host country.
The importance of this point can be seen when one considers that migrants must normally
make country-specific investments. A country-specific investment is an expenditure of resources,
typically by the migrant, which pays off for the migrant only as long as the migrant remains in
the country in question. A classic example of a country-specific investment is learning the
language of a country where that country’s language is not spoken elsewhere (as is the case for
Japan, but not the United States). The migrant to Japan who learns Japanese is unlikely to be able
to earn payoffs if he leaves Japan, except possibly as an interpreter or translator. Another type of
country specific-investment is learning the norms and customs of a country. Migrants also make
country-specific investments by establishing relationships with citizens.
The economic analogy is the firm-specific investment, which is used in labor economics
to describe workers who earn skills that pay off only in the firm in which they are employed.
Once workers make firm-specific investments, they are subject to hold-up by the employer—the
employer can underpay the worker because the worker cannot obtain equal payoffs at other
firms. As a result, workers will not make firm-specific investments unless they receive
contractual or other assurances that they will remain with the firm or be compensated if they are
fired. Similarly, migrants will not make country-specific investments if they believe that they can
be easily deported.12
The state can be seen as akin to an employer, and immigration law then can be
understood in two ways: (1) as a screening device for distinguishing desirable migrants and
undesirable migrants, just as employers use screening devices for distinguishing desirable job
applicants and undesirable job applicants; and (2) as a method for controlling the behavior of
migrants after they are admitted, just as employers use contracts to control workers. This useful
analogy clarifies the way that immigration law is, or can be, structured so to advance its
normative goals. The analogy also draws attention to the crucial assumption of the approach: that
12
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the problem for the state is that migrants have private information both about their characteristics
and their behavior. The state needs to elicit that information in order to advance its goals.
In sum, the state receives payoffs from admitting migrants, and especially migrants who
will work and pay taxes. Migrants receive payoffs from migrating to states where their
employment prospects are superior to those in their home countries. However, migrants will not
migrate in the first place, or make country-specific investments, if they believe that they will be
too easily deported, or subject to abuse. Thus, countries must grant certain rights to migrants in
order to attract them.
B. Methods of Screening
In models used by economists to analyze the hiring process, the analyst assumes that the
employer has limited information about the “type” of a job applicant. “Good types” are workers
whose preferences and abilities are suitable for the employer. “Bad types” are other workers. It is
tempting to assume that employers can determine the type of a worker simply by reading his c.v.
And sometimes they can. But usually employers care about more than the formal educational
achievements of job applicants; they also care about their enthusiasm, diligence, creativity,
ability to work with others, and other characteristics, of which degrees may not be good
predictors. Even prior work experience may give employers little information about the abilities
of a worker.
Employers address these problems in several ways. They invest in verifying information
that job applicants provide, and searching for additional information about the applicant. They
give job applicants tests and subject them to exams. They interview them. They hire them on a
temporary basis, and then give them a permanent position if they demonstrate that they are
suitable for the firm. All of these methods generate information about the job applicants “type,”
enabling the employer to avoid hiring people who lack the appropriate talents.
Immigration authorities face the same problem that employers do. An applicant for
entry—temporary or permanent—possesses private information about his or her “type.” In the
context of immigration, the “good type” of immigrant is the immigrant with two major
characteristics: (1) skills that are valuable for domestic employers, and (2) assimilability. Ideally,
the immigrant will possess both characteristics, but it would be a mistake to assume that only
high-skilled migrants are considered desirable under U.S. policy. U.S. employers also seek
unskilled workers who will take jobs that Americans refuse to take; given the surfeit of unskilled
workers around the world, the goal then is to choose immigrants who are most assimilable.
The government’s strategy is to condition admission on proof that a potential migrant
belongs to the right type. Of course, a potential immigrant of the wrong type has no incentive to
reveal his type, and indeed will engage in “cheap talk”—insisting that he belongs to the good
6

type when he in fact does not. The government therefore obviously cannot take the potential
migrant’s word for it. Instead, the government can (for example) condition a visa on proof that
an employer will hire the migrant and indeed on satisfactory performance for a period of time.
Where the question is not the migrant’s skills but his assimilability, the government could
condition the visa on proof that the migrant speaks English, has lived in the United States, or has
other characteristics or experiences that predict assimilability. In addition, the government could
admit the migrant conditional on eventual assimilation—which can be measured in various ways,
such as avoiding imprisonment, or making friends and establishing relationships.
There are two basic approaches to screening. Under the ex ante approach, the government
examines information about characteristics of the potential migrant that exist at the time of entry:
education, language skills, past experience in the United States, criminal record, and so forth.
Under the ex post approach, the government permits the migrant to enter on a temporary or
conditional basis, and then extends the period of the visa if the migrant shows that he can prosper
in the United States—by obtaining a job, making relationships, joining community organizations,
learning English, and engaging in other actions that demonstrate assimilability. Each approach
has characteristic advantages. Under the ex ante approach, the government avoids taking the risk
that a temporarily admitted migrant disappears into the vast underground economy, and can also
assure the migrant who possesses the right qualifications that she will not be ordered to leave in
the future, thus encouraging the migrant to make country-specific investments. But the ex ante
approach will rarely work well for the vast quantity of unskilled migrants, who cannot
realistically distinguish themselves as assimilable or not on the basis of ex ante information. For
them, the ex post approach is most suitable, as it allows them to prove their assimilability by
prospering while living in the United States.
C. Controlling Behavior and the Rights of Migrants
States also seek to control the behavior of migrants after they enter the country. To
understand the problem, imagine that the screening works perfectly, and so only good types are
admitted. Nonetheless, problems may arise. Even good types may act in ways that do not
advance the state’s interest, and if they do so, the state may be justified in removing them.
The optimal contract framework is helpful here. Imagine that a migrant enters the United
States. The migrant is admitted only because immigration authorities determine that she fills a
gap in the labor market. However, the migrant quits her job soon after admission, qualifies for
public welfare, and commits crimes. This is a problem of moral hazard. To the extent that the
government cannot monitor the migrant and punish or remove her for failing to perform the
actions for which she was admitted, the migrant may have an incentive to “shirk,” and engage in
other actions that may be more profitable for her.
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To counter moral hazard, the government can take a number of actions. It can monitor the
migrant by, for example, requiring her to make reports about her activities to immigration
authorities, which would need to verify her reports. It can keep track of any criminal activity of
which she is convicted. In addition, it must sanction migrants who violate the “contract.”
Removal may be an adequate remedy, but it may not be sufficient. If the cost to the migrant of
removal is not high enough to deter moral hazard, then criminal sanctions may be warranted.
A more difficult problem arises when a migrant who has not acted badly may nonetheless
lose her value to the state. This could happen if, for example, an economic downturn takes place,
so that the migrant’s labor value diminishes. It could also happen in times of insecurity; migrants
from certain countries which become military enemies may be regarded with suspicion. In these
cases, the government may have an incentive to remove the migrant.
However, the government’s hand is constrained. As noted above, the government benefits
if migrants make country-specific investments. But migrants will be reluctant to make countryspecific investments if they believe that they may be removed for any reason or no reason. Thus,
it is important for the state to commit in advance that it will remove migrants only under
specified conditions, including bad behavior by the migrant, but also—if it is desirable—
economic downturn and war. Migrants will reduce their country-specific investments relative to
an absolute guarantee, but the level will be optimal given the government’s uncertainty about the
future.
In this framework, migrants have rights but the rights are endogenous: governments grant
rights to migrants in pursuit of the national interest rather than being constrained by exogenous
moral or constitutional obligations. Governments should grant rights to the extent that doing so is
necessary to attract migrants and encourage them to make country-specific investments, but there
is no reason to believe that the rights of migrants will be the same as the rights of American
citizens. Instead, rights should increase as the migrants’ value for the country increases,
especially where it is desirable to encourage country-specific investment—which is likely to be
the case for skilled workers and not, or less so, for unskilled workers. It will also make sense to
expand the rights of migrants as their residence in the host country lengthens. Due process rights
should be adequate to minimize false positives (where migrants are mistakenly deported) and
false negatives (where migrants are mistakenly permitted to stay) to the extent that resources are
not better used for other purposes. If migrants are risk averse, as is likely, then due process rights
should be substantial, so as to minimize the risk of false positives.
In recent year, controversies have erupted over the criminalization of immigration
violations that earlier had been merely civil violations. For example, it is now a crime to reenter
the United States after having been removed at an earlier time. Many commentators argue that
this trend is unfair or self-defeating. The problem is that removing (or repeatedly removing)
8

immigration law violators may not create sufficient deterrence where the border remains
relatively porous. Thus, harsher sanctions may be justified as a method of discouraging excessive
levels of illegal migration. I will return to this topic in Part III.B.
D. Delegation
An important feature of U.S. immigration law is delegation of authority to private
individuals or non-federal institutions. One could imagine, for example, a screening system that
does not rely on delegation. Applicants for entry submit evidence of their qualifications to
government officials, who evaluate it, and then grant or deny a visa. However, our system does
not work that way.
In the case of employment-related migration, the government delegates in large part to
employers. Employers must sponsor applicants for entry in most cases; in doing so, they signal
their support for the applicant to the government, and provide evidence that the applicant meets
the various criteria for admission. The logical explanation for this approach is that employers
have both better information about the skills of potential migrants, and have better incentives to
distinguish the good types and the bad types, because the good types will contribute more to their
profits.
The problem with delegation is that the agent’s interest will not be perfectly aligned with
that of the principal. Employers want to make profits, not advance national welfare, and so they
will, for example, invest inadequately in screening where they expect migrants to quit shortly
after admission. The law partially addresses this problem by making the migrant’s continued
presence in the country (roughly) conditional on continued employment with the sponsoring
employer. But the law does not address other problems; for example, employers may have little
interest in ensuring that workers are likely to assimilate as long as they contribute to the bottom
line. One can imagine rules that would improve employers’ incentives, for example, by making
them financial responsible when sponsored migrants commit crimes or stop work.
The other main area of immigration law is family reunification. One can again start by
imagining a system that did not involve delegation. Any applicant for permission to migrate
would submit to the immigration authorities a list of the names of relatives who live in the
United States. If the relationships are close or numerous enough, the application would be
improved. But that is not our system. The U.S. system requires that existing family members
sponsor the migrant, which requires, among other things, that the family members promise to
help the migrant adapt to her new surroundings.
A clear advantage of such a system is that U.S. residents will sponsor relatives only (or
mainly) when they are confident that the relatives will succeed as immigrants. Sponsors will seek
to import family members who are industrious and responsible rather than those with
9

propensities toward criminal behavior. In addition, out of bonds of family loyalty, sponsors are
likely to provide assistance to the migrant, helping her to adjust to a new workplace and a new
environment. The system helps ensure that migrants will be welcomed and assimilated into
existing U.S. communities.
On the cost side, family reunification obviously limits migration to people who already
have family members in the United States who are willing to sponsor them. Many qualified
migrants are not so lucky. And sponsors will, as in the case of employers, follow their own
interests rather than those of the country, sponsoring migrants in some cases who may have
criminal proclivities or no desire to work for a living.
Another group of delegates in the U.S. system are the states. Congress has delegated a
range of powers to state governments that are related to immigration. Unlike the case of
employers and families, however, Congress has not given states the power to choose among
potential migrants, at least not explicitly. But Congress has given states a great deal of
enforcement power. Although the limits of these powers are subject to controversy and litigation,
it is clear that states can, for example, report suspected criminals who offer no proof of U.S.
citizenship to the immigration authorities, who can then take action against them. Many states
(and municipalities) aggressively use these powers, while others do not, reflecting different
public attitudes toward migration. In areas where migrants are welcomed, states and cities do not
check for proof of U.S. citizenship even when offering privileges like drivers licenses.
In recent years, the federal government has attempted both to exploit and constrain the
police powers of states in more creative ways. A number of programs require states to check
suspects for immigration status by sending identification data to federal immigration authorities,
and then to turn over the suspects to federal authorities if they are not legally present. In this
way, the U.S. government attempts to take advantage of states’ vast police powers while
preventing states from adopting policies toward immigration contrary to federal law.
III. Five Applications
A. The Points System
We can summarize some of the insights discussed so far by offering a brief set of
criticism of points systems. Under a points system, the government awards points to an applicant
based on the number and kind of desirable characteristics that she has. An applicant will receive
points for, among other things, advanced degrees that show educational attainment; fluency in
the national language; prior experience living in the host country; relationships with citizens; and
related factors that show the applicant’s suitability as a temporary worker or immigrant. Points
systems exist in Canada and other countries. Many immigration reformers praise points
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systems13 because they seem like a logical way to ensure that immigration serves the national
interest; these systems are contrasted to America’s apparently chaotic approach that relies on the
uncoordinated efforts of employers and family members.
Yet the points system is not as appealing as it first seems. First, the points system
assumes away the problem of asymmetric information in the screening process. It is simply
assumed that the government can reliably determine people’s qualifications. But the government
is not in a good position to determine whether, say, a degree in electrical engineering from
university X in Cambodia is as good as a degree in electrical engineering from university Y in
Peru. Only employers can reliably determine whether job applicants will serve their needs. And
the points system overlooks the benefits from ex post evaluation—where people are admitted on
the basis of very general criteria and then permitted to remain if they obtain jobs, avoid crime,
and become assimilated. Recall also that labor market needs do not always track educational
attainments; the economy may need, say, nurses rather than doctors. Indeed, in this respect the
points system assumes that the government can determine which sectors of the labor market are
in need of replenishment, when in fact employers are more likely to possess this information.
Second, and related, the points system is particularly inappropriate for a country like the
United States, where there is significant demand for unskilled foreign labor. Points systems that
value educational credentials undervalue unskilled labor; a points system could be adjusted so
that educational attainments are not given points, but then there would be no way to give
preference to highly educated people where their labor is demanded.
Third, the points system ignores the problem of controlling migrants once they are here.
To be fair, proponents of points systems are not usually focused on this problem. But by the
same token they ignore a vast area of immigration law. Even people who score well on the points
system might decide, once they obtain admission, not to pursue productive activities and instead
become a public charge or turn to a life of crime. To counter these incentives, the government
must monitor and sanction migrants, even those who are admitted legally.
Finally, the points system ignores the advantages of delegation. As noted above, the
government is not in a strong position to evaluate applicants for entry, and may even be at a
disadvantage with respect to enforcement compared to states and municipalities. Delegation
exploits the informational advantages of private individuals and other governmental entities. By
contrast, the points system assumes a top-down approach administered by the national
government, and thus contains all the disadvantages of that type of approach.
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B. “Crimmigration”
It is common to think of illegal immigration as a public policy failure that results from
the government’s reluctance to expend adequate resources to enforce the law. But this thinking is
question-begging: why doesn’t the government expend greater resources to enforce the law. Cox
and I argued that one can better conceive of an “illegal immigration system” in which the
government consciously encourages or allows migrants to enter the country illegally while
retaining the authority to remove them for any reason, with minimal due process. 14 Thus, while
the lawful system is characterized by high ex ante barriers to entry, plus (relatively) strong
protections from removal, the illegal system is characterized by (relatively) low ex ante barriers
to entry (for example, overstaying a tourist visa) and weak protections from removal.15
The case for the illegal immigration system is that immigration policy seeks to meet a
large demand for unskilled labor, but it is very difficult to screen people who lack credentials.
For unskilled labor, the biggest concern is that the migrant will be unable to assimilate, but
ability to assimilate is not something that can be observed at the border. Instead, the government
allows entry, but retains the authority to remove the migrant for any reason—crime, joblessness,
even economic downturn—while also periodically granting a path to citizens via amnesty bills to
migrants who satisfy certain criteria—obtain employment, learn English, and so forth. The courts
have implicitly endorsed this approach by refusing to grant robust due process protections to
illegal migrants subject to removal procedures.
In recent years, immigration scholars have drawn attention to so-called crimmigration,
which for present purposes I will define as the increasing use of criminal law and criminal law
enforcement against illegal migrants.16 Starting in the 1980s, Congress has criminalized a
number of acts that traditionally were civil immigration violations and has enhanced penalties for
criminal immigration violations; and the executive branch has significantly increased resources
devoted to criminal immigration enforcement.17 Immigration law scholars have deplored this
trend on several grounds, namely, that in practice migrants are given summary procedures which
inadequately protect their rights, and that their incentives to assimilate will be weakened if they
are faced with arbitrary procedures or the criminalization of the very acts that lead to

14

Cox and Posner, Second-Order Structure, supra at 813–14 (2007).
Both Bush and Obama have pursued a policy of cracking down on illegal immigrants who commit crimes, while
generally leaving alone those who do not. See Julia Preston, Immigration Officials Arrest More Than 3,100, NY
Times (NY Times Apr 2 2012), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/us/immigration-officials-arrest-morethan-3100.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=immigration%20sweep&st=cse (visited July 23 2012); Julia Preston and John H.
Cushman, Jr., Obama To Permit Young Migrants To Remain In U.S., New York Times, June 16, 2012, at A1.
16
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 Colum L Rev Sidebar 135 (2009); David Alan
Sklanksy, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 New Crim L Rev 157 (2012); Ingrid V. Eagly,
Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw U L Rev 1281 (2010).
17
Chacón, 109 Colum L Rev Sidebar at 137–38 (cited in note 10).
15

12

assimilation (including the criminalization of various forms of “harboring” where Americans
lend aid to illegal migrants).18
However, there are several good reasons for this trend. First, as noted, prosecution for
criminal violations may contribute to screening of low-skill migrants who otherwise do not
possess visible differentiating characteristics that the state could use to distinguish the good
migrants from the bad. Immigration policy seeks people who will assimilate; all things equal,
participation in criminal activity signals a personality type that is unlikely to assimilate. To be
sure, one might object that the current system is excessively crude. 19 It makes the judgment of a
migrant’s potential for assimilation turn on a single criminal act rather than on consideration of
all relevant factors, such as the length of time that migrant has resided in the country, whether he
has learned the language, whether he is normally employed, and so forth. A more flexible system
may be called for.
Second, criminalization of immigration violations will generally enhance deterrence by
subjecting violators to more serious punishments. At the same time, the involvement of criminal
process helps prevent wrongful conviction.
Third, deportation may be a cheap and effective way of deterring people from committing
serious crimes that are not immigration-related. Deportation is cheaper than a long period of
imprisonment; thus, holding constant the magnitude of the sanction, the government can reduce
its costs by giving a convicted criminal a short prison term and then deporting him rather than by
giving him a long prison term (assuming reentry can be prevented).
Some commentators object to deportation on the grounds that it is akin to “exile” of U.S.
citizens, which is unconstitutional, at least when migrants have sufficient contact with the United
States as to entitle them to “membership” in this country.20 However, the constitutional
prohibition on exile does not apply to non-citizens, and there is no particular reason to extend it
to non-citizens. There may well be cases where deportation would impose an unacceptable
hardship on the migrant—for example, where the migrant has resided in the United States since
she was a child and does not speak the language or have any contacts with the country in which
she was born. Thus, one might support limitations on deportation where deportation would be
inhumane. But it would be wrong to conclude that deportation is inhumane in the more routine
case where the migrant has substantial contacts with her home country. 21 By contrast, exile of a

18

See Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring Doctrine, 24 Geo Immigr L J 146, 152–54 (2010).
See generally, Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L Rev 1705
(2011) (arguing that focusing on the single criminal moment is superficial because an individual is a collection of
many moments and experiences).
20
McLeod, at 22-34. []
21
In one of the few proposals by an immigration scholar to use the threat of removal to address crime problems,
Eleanor Brown creatively argues that people in a terrorist’s network who fail to inform on him would be deprived of
19

13

U.S. citizen will normally cause great hardship because (in the absence of special circumstances
like dual citizenship) that person will have no right to citizenship in a foreign country, and so
could end up stateless.
There are other problems with deportation as a criminal sanction. It will be ineffective if
the violator can simply reenter the country. And it may result in the export of criminals to
countries with weaker criminal justice systems where they may continue to wreak havoc. Thus,
in certain conditions a country may properly refrain from deporting criminals as a form of
international cooperation or development aid.
C. Labor and Employment Law
As Keith Cunningham-Parmeter notes, it was traditionally assumed that illegal workers
and lawful workers had the same rights in the workplace—including the rights to form unions
and to be free of discrimination (except to the extent that employers may fire a worker or refuse
to hire him on the basis of illegal status).22 But in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
the Supreme Court held that illegal workers could not recover damages for certain labor law
violations that were available to lawful workers, and since then other cases have suggested ways
in which the rights of illegal and lawful workers diverge under both labor law and employment
law.23
Cunningham-Parmeter fears that this trend will isolate illegal workers, to the detriment of
themselves and to the legal community. Yet there are strong reasons for denying rights to illegal
migrants that are granted to citizens and lawful permanent residents. Some context is useful here.
Illegal migrants have no right to work at all—just as many lawful foreign residents may enter the
country on a visa but lack the right to work. Thus, it is not obvious that it is unfair that if they
work illegally, they lack some of the rights that lawful workers possess.
Existing law reflects a judgment that rights can be used to lure desirable workers to this
country, and to reward them in stages as they prove themselves fit subjects for citizenship. Thus,
people who enter lawfully after proving their credentials receive more rights than people who
enter illegally; and people who have obtained a green card receive more rights than people who
merely have visas. If this scheme serves legitimate public policy objectives,24 then Cunninghamtheir visas or access to visas. See Eleanor Brown, A Visa to “Snitch”: An Addendum to Cox and Posner, 87 Notre
Dame L Rev 973, 1003 (2012) (“An Addendum”).
22
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Parmeter’s proposal that illegal workers be given the same rights as legal workers would
undermine those objectives.
In a related article, Stephen Lee argues that employers may use immigration laws to
ensure the removal of workers who draw attention to workplace violations.25 Under the law,
employers are not supposed to hire illegal migrants; if they do so anyway, they may be subject to
sanctions. But in practice, the government relies on employers to screen out illegal workers, and
so when employers report illegal workers to the government, the government gratefully detains
them rather than questioning the employer’s motives.
Lee, like Cunningham-Parmeter, emphasizes ugly aspects of a system that limits the
rights of migrants for policy reasons. He further emphasizes that delegation of screening power
to employers allows them to subject foreign workers to harsh working conditions, which may
also deprive U.S. workers of employment because employers must give U.S. workers better
working conditions. The problem is the result of agency costs: employers do not share the
government’s interests in excluding foreign workers, and still less the government’s interest in
workplace safety. Delegation to employers thus inevitably leads to perverse outcomes unless the
government modifies employers’ incentives.
But it is not clear that the solution is to give illegally present foreign workers the same
rights as U.S. workers. Conferring employment and labor rights on illegal workers would have
the following effects, some of them offsetting. First, the U.S. labor market would become more
attractive to foreign workers to the extent that they value these rights, and thus their incentive to
migrate illegally would increase, exacerbating the problem of illegal immigration. Second,
however, employers would find foreign workers less attractive because the cost of employing
them would rise. The second effect would probably predominate over the first, because if foreign
workers valued the rights more than the wage offset, then employers would probably give those
rights to them voluntarily. Third, conferring those rights on foreign workers may benefit U.S.
workers—for example, by encouraging whistleblowing or facilitating unionization—but this
would be another reason why employers would more reluctant to hire foreign workers if required
to give them U.S. rights. Thus, the overall effect of granting labor and employment rights to
foreign illegal workers would likely be to reduce the demand for their labor, which would harm
them as well as U.S. consumers who benefit from their work. Such an approach would be in
tension with the traditional illegal immigration system, which provides work and potentially a
path to citizenship to unskilled foreign workers with no attachment to this country.
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D. Screening of Low-Skilled Workers
Cox and I argued that what we call the “illegal immigration system” in the United States
may be due in part to the difficulty of screening low-skilled workers plus constitutional
constraints on removal of legal immigrants.26 Suppose that a country demands low-skilled labor.
The world presents an ample supply of such workers, but they will look largely identical to the
country’s government. Selection cannot be based on educational credentials because most lowskilled workers have none beyond perhaps primary education; in addition, educational
credentials may have little relevance to the work. What the government seeks are people who
work hard, who obey the law, and—where the demand is for temporary workers rather than
permanent migrants—who will return to their country when their labor is no longer needed. All
of these characteristics are unobservable, and formal proxies—for example, the absence of a
criminal record, an employment history, and so forth—may be unreliable.
We argue that to address this problem U.S. policy has been to look the other way and
permit workers to enter the country illegally, while retaining the authority to remove them if they
are caught committing crimes or seeking public welfare, or even if the demand for labor
declines. Because the workers are present in the country illegally rather than on visas,
constitutional protections are minimal, and so deportation can be accomplished cheaply, using
summary procedures. Meanwhile, workers who stay in the country for a long time, prosper,
assimilate, and avoid criminal activity may eventually be given a path to citizenship through
discretionary legislation.
In an interesting paper, Eleanor Brown describes a program in Canada which overcomes
the problems with ex ante screening of unskilled or low-skill agricultural workers.27 Canada and
Jamaica have entered an arrangement under which Canada “outsources” to Jamaica the task of
screening Jamaicans who apply for visas to work temporarily in Canada. Canada provides
Jamaica with some minimal criteria for entry—emphasizing health, strength, farming experience,
and lack of criminal record. Crucially, because Jamaica benefits from permitting its citizens to
work in Canada (in part through remittances), the Jamaican government has strong incentives to
screen out people who do not meet Canada’s criteria and who plan to overstay the visa and work
illegally. Jamaica, in turn, has selected people on the basis of (1) strong ties to the country (such
as participation in a family farm); (2) reports from informal community records that indicate that
the applicant has avoided criminal activity (formal police reports are unreliable); and (3)
residence in rural communities, which tend to be more tight-knit than urban communities.28
Jamaica also educates workers accepted into the program about the penalties for violating the
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rules and the consequences for communities that rely on it.29 Jamaican officials are even
permitted to enter Canadian territory to monitor and provide aid to workers.
As Brown explains, in this system Canada overcomes both screening and control
problems by delegating some of the administration of the program to Jamaica. Jamaica has better
information about the “types” of applicants than Canada does, and Jamaica has means of
disciplining violators that Canada lacks—which includes appealing to their sense of honor and
patriotism, and their concerns for the well-being of compatriots who would be harmed if the
program were shut down.30 The delegation of authority to an agent always raises concerns about
the incentives of the agent, but here Canada is in a good position to evaluate Jamaica’s efforts—
simply by counting up the number of workers who go AWOL from the program and receiving
reports from employers about the quality of work. Canada can credibly threaten to shut down the
program if Jamaica fails to screen properly, and in turn Jamaica has apparently put a great deal of
creativity into developing effective screening procedures.
E. Bonding
Another issue Cox and I addressed was the problem of ensuring that migrants or foreign
workers comply with the conditions of entry. Temporary foreign workers, for example, must
promise that they will work, comply with the law, and exit the country when their visas expire. A
major problem with low-skilled workers is that they may enter the country lawfully but then
overstay their visa and then remain in the country and work illegally. Some countries require
foreign workers to post a bond when they enter the country; they forfeit this bond if they violate
the terms of entry. Eleanor Brown has advocated a similar system for the United States.31
The approach has some obvious merits. Under current law, workers have little to lose by
overstaying their visa. They are unlikely to be caught and deported; even if they are, the penalties
are usually light. Part of the problem is the cost of tracking down illegal workers and then
processing them through the immigration system. By contrast, a bonding mechanism works
virtually automatically. For example, the mechanism could be set up so that the worker recovers
the bond when she returns to her home country and provides proof to the American embassy that
she no longer resides in the United States. The embassy could check to see if the migrant has a
U.S. criminal record; if not, it will return the bond to her.
The major problem with this approach is that most unskilled workers will not have
enough money to post a bond. Thus a bond requirement could significantly reduce the supply of
29
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unskilled labor to the United States, and also do little to relieve the pressure of illegal
immigration. Brown suggests that workers may be able to borrow money for the bond from local
banks. The bond would be returned from the U.S. government to the bank when the migrant’s
visa expires and the migrant has returned to her home country. 32 The problem with this proposal
is that banks will not usually lend money to poor people, especially in countries where it is
difficult to bring lawsuits to enforce debts. Banks would demand collateral and in most cases the
worker will not be able to supply it. Maybe in some cases, workers will be able to use the family
farm or other property of family members or relatives as collateral, but again only a limited
group of people would have this capacity. Thus, while the bonding proposal makes sense from a
theoretical perspective, its practical value is probably limited.
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